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Abstract—Autonomous planning in safety critical systems
is a difficult task where decisions must carefully balance
optimisation for performance goals of the system while also
keeping the system away from safety hazards. These tasks
often conflict, and hence present a challenging multi-objective
planning problem where at least one of the objectives relates to
safety risk. Recasting safety risk into an objective introduces
additional requirements on planning algorithms: safety risk
cannot be “averaged out” nor can it be combined with other
objectives without loss of information and losing its intended
purpose as a tool in risk reduction. Thus, existing algorithms
for multi-objective planning cannot be used directly as they
do not provide any facility to accurately track and update
safety risk. A common workaround is to restrict available
decisions to those guaranteed safe a priori, but this can be
overly conservative and hamper performance significantly. In
this paper, we propose a planning algorithm based on multi-
objective Monte-Carlo Tree Search to resolve these problems by
recognising safety risk as a first class objective. Our algorithm
explicitly models the safety of the system separately from the
performance of the system, uses safety risk to both optimise
and provide constraints for safety in the planning process, and
uses an ALARP-based preference selection method to choose an
appropriate safe plan from its output. The preference selection
method chooses from the set of multiple safe plans to weigh
risk against performance. We demonstrate the behaviour of
the algorithm using an example representative of safety critical
decision-making.
Keywords-Safety critical systems, Planning, Safety, POMDP,
Monte-Carlo Tree Search
I. INTRODUCTION
Safe decision making will always concern trade-offs be-
tween safety and other performance characteristics of the
system. This trade-off, naturally done by human decision-
makers, is challenging for autonomous systems of unmanned
vehicles and process industries.
The safety-performance trade-off has two goals: optimis-
ing the preformance-related attributes of the system when
they are within acceptably safe limits, and, to prioritise
safety over these performance-related attributes when safety
and performance conflict with each other. Additionally, it
is desirable that these safe limits still allow decisions to be
made safer if there is no prohibitively large cost associated
with the decision.
Traditionally, techniques based on Partially Observable
Markov Decision Processes (POMDP) have both theoretical
and practical limitations [1] in solving planning problems
with multiple objectives. In particular, these limitations
prevent any sensible method of combining safety attributes
along with performance attributes and hence it is difficult
to apply the safety-performance trade-off in single-objective
POMDP planning based on dynamic programming.
To tackle this problem, we apply a recently introduced
algorithm by Wang and Sebag [2] that enables using the
safety-performance trade-off within a practical POMDP-
based multi-objective planning algorithm. As shown in this
paper, the algorithm provides us with the necessary tools
to both treat safety as a first-class concept and objective
alongside other performance-related objectives as well as
select a final preference after gathering all possible solution
plans (i.e. a posteori).
Preference selection in safety critical systems involves
some concept of risk as it relates in safety – i.e. risk to
human life. We use the conceptual framework of the As Low
As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle in this paper
to be used as a preference selection mechanism for planning
with objectives of cost and risk. The ALARP principle [3]
is used outside normal decision-making to make decisions
in safety-related systems in the UK and is typically defined
as the act of reducing risk such that further reduction of risk
is grossly disproportionate to the cost benefit gained.
Our paper builds upon the concept of decision-making
that is currently used in POMDP-literature and adapts it for
safety critical applications through the use of multi-objective
planning. We propose a variant of the Monte-Carlo Tree
Search algorithm that integrates methods to ensure that the
decisions made are safe.
II. THE SAFETY PLANNING PROBLEM
The safety planning problem is one where individual
decisions can be safety critical. Hence, the aim of a safety
planner is to generate a policy (as a solution for the safety
planning problem) that includes contingencies that take
into account the safety critical behaviour of the system.
We characterise safety as an objective separate from other
system performance objectives.
A. Problem Structure
As safety critical systems have to deal with real world
environments, we frame the safe decision-making problem
as a variant of a Partially Observable Markov Decision
Process (POMDP) which has the ability to model stochastic
real world processes. The role of the decision-maker is to
make a sequence of decisions which influences the safety of
the system: at runtime, risk may be increased or decreased
through a combination of decisions.
As POMDPs are only a mathematical abstraction of the
system, this section considers a number of characteristics
that are specific to the problem of safe decision-making. In
particular, we need to consider how to structure the state
space of the problem, how the planner is guided to search
for a good policy, and, what the practical and safety-related
requirements of the POMDP representation of the decision
problem and the planning algorithm are.
B. Guiding the Planner
The planner is guided through the search space by two
broad characteristics that need to be defined within the
POMDP representation:
• Using rewards until the algorithm converges and finds
a sequence of decisions maximise cumulative reward.
• Using costs (negative rewards) until the algorithm finds
a sequence of decisions that can reach a goal state with
the minimum costs.
Following the advice and reasoning stated by Hansen [4],
we take the approach of using both costs and goal states.
This approach is more suitable for safety critial real world
problems as the goals can be explicitly defined.
C. Structuring the Model
Constructing a model for a particular application is
domain-specific. Our particular modelling scheme explicitly
captures both the process and safety artifacts of the safety
critical system by structuring the model around safety-
related concepts of hazards and modes (the mode of opera-
tion of the system). We propose modelling the system using
three types of model to provide the necessary information for
the planning algorithm to determine safe decisions, namely:
• the process model: the model of the entire decision
process which defines the search space that the planner
needs to make performance-related decisions but not
necessarily be able to calculate safety-related ones
accurately.
• the mode model: derived from the process model, it
models the current mode of the system which dictates
the safety criticality of the system – this is necessary
to determine what risk models need to used to measure
the risks of hazards within the system, and
• the risk model(s): derived from the process model, it
models potential hazards of individual decisions and
provides the a measure of risk for failures of the system.
We recognise that there can be alternative formulations
of modelling. The process model and risk models could
be combined together to form one very complex model.
The merit of this idea is that the process model can be
easily supplemented with safety information. However, we
recognise there are two issues. Firstly, mixing both the
complexities of the process and risk models can hide the
important detail about safety. Secondly, a complex process-
risk model can only be updated approximately – keeping
them both separate allows an approximate update of the non-
safety related process model and an exact update of the risk
model that provides safety critical information.
Furthermore, this separation allows computational benefits
as it is effectively a factorisation (a minimisation of the
POMDP state search space) of the model representation
– we can update the process model approximately when
running expensive simulations in our planning algorithm,
whereas the safety and mode models are crucial to making
safe decisions, and can be updated accurately when needed.
As described later in Section III, this also avoids the problem
where a limited number of Monte-Carlo samples may never
capture low-probability events which are safety critical.
III. MULTIOBJECTIVE PARTIALLY OBSERVABLE MONTE
CARLO PLANNING
A. Modelling the Process
One of the difficulties with using POMDPs to model a
real decision process is providing a way to terminate the
planning process. The standard representations of POMDPs
and Goal-oriented POMDPs do have the ability to terminate,
but are very restrictive for the following reasons [4]:
1) Standard POMDPs rely on a discount factor and
tolerance parameters which make the assumption that
as decisions in the future are less likely to impact the
decision now; however, there is no guidance on how
to define these parameters. Furthermore, information
about future objectives is lost through repeated multi-
plying with the discount factor.
2) Decision processes in Goal-oriented POMDPs only
terminates when the probability that the decision pro-
cess is in goal states sum to one. Due to noisy sensors,
this may not always be the case. Using tolerance
parameters could solve the problem but they would
also need to be tuning to the problem.
We address this by using a slightly stricter variation of
Hansen’s “Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
with Action Termination” (POMDP-ACT) [4] to model the
process. The chief differences from the standard POMDP
representation are as follows:
1) All costs must be positive. Rewards (costs that are
negative) are often used traditionally as it matches the
concept of positive reinforcement and is sufficient for
many domains – in safety-critical systems, risk is the
predominant concept which requires costs.
2) POMDP-ACT has terminal states that explicitly model
states where the process being modelled stops. These
are not present in the standard POMDP explicitly, but
match the concept of goal states in Goal-POMDPs.
3) POMDP-ACT introduces termination actions that will
always transition to a terminal state from any state.
This differs from both standard and Goal-POMDPs,
and helps design decision processes which can always
terminate and return some policies.
More precisely, we can define a POMDP-ACT as a tuple
Mp : 〈S,A,Z, T,O,C〉 where:
• S,A,Z - are the sets of: discrete states, actions, and
observations, respectively.
• T (s′, s, a) - is the probability function that a state
s transitions to a state s′ given that an action a is
performed.
• O(z, s′, a) - is the probability function that an obser-
vation z is observed given that the state transitioned to
is s′ when the action a is performed.
• C(s, a) - is the cost of performing an action in state
s. This is also known as negative reward. It is a vector
corresponding to each objective.
B. Mode and Risk Models
Constructing mode and risk models separately from the
process model can easily lead to having them inconsistent
from each other. As the process model should be adequately
defined to contain the information required to distinguish
modes of the system as well as the risk present within the
system, the mode and risk models can be defined through
a transformation from the process model (we recognise
that this is a separate and difficult problem within itself).
The chief difference is the ability to update the mode and
risk models accurately and efficiently to detect the safety-
criticality of the system and allow the planner to perform
accordingly. As these models do not have any decision-
making ability of their own, they are defined as Hidden
Markov Models (HMM) rather than POMDPs.
The mode model is defined as a tuple: Mm :
〈Sm, Zm, Om〉 where:
• Sm - is the set of discrete states that are sufficient to
represent the different modes of the system’s process.
• Zm - is the set of discrete observations that can be
observed that influence the belief of the mode.
• Om(zm, s
′
m, sm) - is the probability function that an
observation zm ∈ Zm is observed given that the state
transitioned to from sm ∈ Sm is s
′
m ∈ Sm.
The risk model(s) is defined as a tuple: Mx :
〈Sx, Zx, Ox, Sm′ , V,H〉 where:
• Sx - is the set of discrete states representing the safety
aspects i.e. hazardous states in system’s process.
• Zx - is the set of discrete observations that can be
observed that influence the belief of the hazard.
• Ox(zx, s
′
x, sx) - is the probability function that an
observation zx ∈ Zx is observed given that the state
transitioned to from sx ∈ Sx is s
′
x ∈ Sx.
• V - is a set of hazard severities.
• Sm′ - is a set of such that Sm′ ⊆ Sm, i.e. it is subset
of the mode state set where the risk model is active.
• H : Sx → V - is function of state to hazard severity.
To complete the definition, a group of functions are
needed to transform the process model to the mode and
risk models. We call this mapping tuple φm and define it
as 〈αm, βm, γm〉, where:
• αm : S → Sm is a surjective (many-to-one) function
from the process state space to the mode state space.
• βm : A × Z → Zm is a surjective (many-to-one)
function from the action and observation state space
to the observations required to detect the mode.
• γm : T ×O → Om which is a function that transforms
the conditional probability tables (CPTs) of the transi-
tions and observations in the process model to a CPT
of the observations in the mode model.
Likewise, for each risk model Mx, there is a mapping
tuple φx which defines the mapping of the process model to
the risk model. This tuple is 〈αx, βx, γx〉, where αx, βx, and
γx are defined similarly to αm, βm, and γm respectively.
C. Adequacy Properties of Models
We define an adequate model in a safe decision-making
context to be one that leads to decision-making behaviour
that has an acceptable level of safety risk. To aid discussion,
we use the concept of ground truth, which is the true or
real process which we are attempting to model. This is
used in the context of comparing our models, which are
approximations, with it.
Using this definition, the models must have these high
level properties to be adequate:
1) The mode model is acceptably accurate relative to
the ground truth: it has a significant impact on safety
because it activates and deactivates risk models.
2) The risk model calculates an exact or pessimistic risk
values (relative to the ground truth) for the system to
be safe.
3) The mode model and risk model is consistent with the
process model.
As a result of these properties, (3) implies that the process
model maintains a degree of independence from the safety-
related properties of the system and can be used solely
for the purpose of optimising performance-related system
behaviour.
These properties give a ‘separation of concerns’ with
regards to verification and validation of models separating
out what models need to be consistent with the ground truth.
As, by definition, the ground truth relates to the reality of
some domain-specific problem, the adequacy of the mode
and risk models involves showing that they are accurate, well
tested, validated using known theory of the domain and that
the risk of the runtime plan execution to detect the mode
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Figure 1: Standard Monte-Carlo Tree Search Stages (based
on diagrams in [5] and [6])
wrongly is acceptably low. We do not go into verification
and validation further in this paper – this is an avenue for
future work.
Firstly, we consider the mode model. The mode model
is constructed using a transformation mapping φm. αm
transforms the state space from the process model to the
mode model. This effectively partitions the process model
state space into a number of modes. For this to be consistent,
the transitions between states in the mode model must be
consistent with the transitions between the corresponding
subsets of the process model state space: ∀s, s′ ∈ S, a ∈
A, z ∈ Z,Om(αm(s), βm(a, z)) = T (s
′, s, a)×O(z, s′, a).
Secondly, we consider the risk model. The risk model
must be consistent with the process model when the risk
model is ‘active’ according to the mode model. Recall that
for a given risk model Mx, it is active when there is a state
s ∈ Sm′ that is also s ∈ Sm in the process model Mp.
Hence, for an active risk model Mx, ∀s, s
′ ∈ S, a ∈ A, z ∈
Z,Ox(αx(s), βx(a, z)) = T (s
′, s, a) × O(z, s′, a) ∧ s′′ ∈
Sm′ ∧ s
′′ ∈ Sm, provided the process model’s transition
function is consistent with the mode model.
D. Algorithm
The Monte-Carlo Tree Search is a search technique that
builds a search tree of results by making random decisions
and evaluating their outcomes through stochastic simulations
[5]. Here, we consider this algorithm in terms of a planning
technique. A set of four typical stages (Fig. 1) is run
each search iteration to build this search tree incrementally
[6]: Selection, Expansion, Simulation and Backpropagation.
After many simulations, the set of best policies (i.e. the
pareto-front over all policies searched) can be inferred from
this search tree [6] that can be used for execution of the plan
at runtime.
We propose an adaptation of the Multi-objective Monte
Carlo Tree Search algorithm [2] for safe decision-making
in partially observable domains called Multi-Objective
Monte-Carlo Tree Search for Safety Critical Applications
(MOMCTS-SC). Our algorithm is specifically adapted to
use the POMDP-ACT representation. We define two types
of node rather than one: an action node and an observation
node because the state is no longer fully observable after
each action and depends on the observation following the
action. Like Silver and Veness [7], we maintain beliefs as
a particle filter (a sampled representation of the belief) but,
as opposed to storing with each node, we store the particle
filter with just each observation node.
The general operation of this algorithm is described in this
section and, for reference, the pseudo code of MOMCTS-
SC is shown in Algorithm 1, 2 and 3. The notation used is
defined as follows:
• N (node), Na (action node), No (observation node).
• nX (visit count of a node X), BX (belief of node X).
• Mm (mode model), Mx (risk model).
• Heuristic PW (n) is used to widen the search tree [8].
• r is a reward vector (i.e. costs in our case).
To simplify discussion, we consider the behaviour of
the algorithm from two conditions: firstly, we consider the
behaviour without the mode and risk models, and secondly,
we consider the behaviour when the mode and risk models
actively constrain the actions that are admissible for plan-
ning. Finally, we provide a brief description on how the
safety objective is optimised.
In the first condition, the behaviour of the algorithm
is much the same as Wang’s MOMCTS algorithm[8]. It
chooses between whether to apply exploration and exploita-
tion in the expansion stage of the algorithm by using the
hypervolume-based UCT heuristic (HV-UCT). Exploitation
within the algorithm involves walking down the search tree
to exploit existing nodes that have been previously visited
if they seem promising. Exploitation involves exploring less
visited nodes by performing new playout (a Monte-Carlo
run) simulations to expand the search tree. The Algorithm 2
illustrates this. The chief difference from the original al-
gorithm in this condition is that the algorithm is POMDP-
ACT aware: it terminates on termination actions AT and
can handle partially observable states by keeping track of
observations and the associated beliefs.
Under this condition, low probability events may never
be sampled. Take, for example, events regarding failures
of components: the IEC 61580 standard [9] defines Safety
Integrity Levels which define the probabilities that a failure
can occur for a component in continuous operation to be in
the range of 10−5 and 10−9h−1. For “failures” in decisions
made hourly, this would only be optimistically sampled
once every 100,000 and 1,000,000,000 samples respectively
(only if every event can be accounted for and tracked).
Having a satisfactory magnitude of samples to be confident
that the algorithm has found any of these low probability
events would not be possible with current hardware. Instead,
the behaviour of the algorithm under the second condition
tackles this problem.
In the second condition, under the mode and risk models,
the algorithm also updates the admissible actions accord-
ing to these dynamically updated risk models. When the
algorithm is in the expansion stage, an admissible action
Input: root node N , sample size L
Output: pareto front P
for i← 1 to L do
Sample state s from BN
r, P ← TREEWALK(N, ∅, s)
end
return P
Algorithm 1: MOMCTS-SC
is chosen. The admissible actions are actions that can be
performed from the current playout’s state because they
are valid for the process model (e.g. physically possible)
and constrained by the active risk model(s) (i.e. constrained
otherwise it is too dangerous). Before the simulation of the
playout occurs, the least visited action is chosen. The mode
and active risk models are updated with this choice of action
and this is used to validate whether the action is indeed
admissible (and removing it from the set of admissible
actions if necessary). If it is admissible, the simulation
playout proceeds. Otherwise this process of checking least
visited actions, removing if inadmissible, and updating the
risk models will proceed recursively.
The update of the mode model also activates or deactivates
new risk models based on whether they are appropriate for
the new belief in the mode (i.e. whether the model should
be activated for the belief of the system). Thus, for low
probability events such as failures, activated risk models can
give an evaluation of risk without invoking many simulation
playouts as would the first condition.
Finally, optimising a safety-related objective is achieved
by using the risk models to provide a risk value that is
passed as one of the multiple objectives. The algorithm will
then proceed to plan using this additional risk objective and
provide solutions that do optimise for this objective.
E. Updating Mode and Risk Models
To prevent recalculation of the beliefs at each traversal
of the search tree, a particle filter of each belief can be
maintained in each observation node. Thus, the beliefs in
the search tree only need to be updated when a new node
is created – and this can be done using a single-step belief
update [10].
When the current belief is updated, both the mode and
risk model may be updated. The mode model is updated
first as it may activate and deactivate risk models depending
whether they are still relevant to the current belief. The mode
model is updated before the risk models because the mode
belief state may change when the action and observation pair
update the current belief. Hence, if the state of the system
moves into a new mode, other risk models may be activated
whereas others would be deactivated as they are no longer
relevant.
However, this leads to the question: what is the initial
belief of the risk model. Several approaches may be taken:
Input: node N , pareto front P
Output: reward vector r, pareto front P
// if N has children and no PW needed
if CHILDREN(N) 6= ∅ ∧ ¬PW (nN ) then
// Selection stage
c∗ ← argmaxc{∀c ∈
CHILDREN(N),HV-UCT(rc, P )};
r, P ← TREEWALK(N,P, c);
else
// Expansion and Simulation stage
Recursively try and select the least visited action a
from AN which is admissible subject to the models
Mp, Mm and Mx whilst updating Mm and Mx
before each of these selections.
s′, o, r, P ← SIMULATE(N,P, a);
if ¬∃Na, Na ∈ CHILDREN(N) then
Create new node Na as child of N ;
CHILDREN(N)← CHILDREN(N) ∪Na;
end
if ¬∃No, No ∈ CHILDREN(Na) then
Create new node No as child of Na;
Update belief BNo with s
′;
CHILDREN(Na)← CHILDREN(Na) ∪No;
Store updated Mm and Mx in No;
end
Increment visit count nNa and nNo ;
// Backpropagate rewards
Update rNo with reward r and risk model(s) Mx;
end
return P
Algorithm 2: TREEWALK
Input: node T , pareto front P , action a
Output: first state s, first obs. o, total reward vector r,
pareto front P
trace← run simulation with action a;
s, o, r ← first step of trace;
// update pareto front
if ∀rp ∈ P, r  rp then
P ← (P \ {∀rp ∈ P, r ≻ rp}) ∪ {r};
end
return s, o, r, P
Algorithm 3: SIMULATE
1) the initial state is predefined by the mode change,
2) the previous history of observations before the risk
model is used to initialise the state, and
3) the risk model begins uninitialised with a special ‘un-
certainty’ state linked with an ‘uncertainty’ objective
which drives the tree search to update sensor values.
The first two approaches are fairly trivial to implement
and are domain specific, whereas the latter is more general
but incurs the penalty of another search objective. We opted
for the first approach in our example.
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Figure 2: Cliff World
IV. EXAMPLE
We have applied our algorithm to a variant of “Cliff
World” [11][12]. The purpose of this example is to demon-
strate the behaviour of the algorithm under normal circum-
stances and a circumstance that is particularly concerning
with respect to safety critical planning: low probability
events with catastrophic consequences. As mentioned in
section III, existing Monte-Carlo planning algorithms cannot
cope with these types of events due to sampling, whereas
exact algorithms, such as dynamic programming, lose infor-
mation about the risk when it is encoded into the reward
value. In the first scenario, we consider “usual” behaviour
where the bad outcomes can be easily determined. The
second and third scenarios consider low probability events
that have catastropic consequences. In latter scenario, it is
shown that the risk model can be used to avoid this catas-
trophic consequence – the risk model approach naturally also
handle the “usual” behaviour and is not included due to
space constraints. We have made the algorithm and example
available at: https://github.com/raedwulf/libysp.
A. Cliff World Definition
Consider a simple agent (robot) that travels from a starting
square to a goal square in a two dimensional X by Y grid
which has a slope towards the cliff edge. The journey has
an element of risk such that the agent may slip off the edge
of the cliff squares in grid if it is too close. This slipping
occurs under some probability when the agent attempts to
leave the square – i.e. in this example, if the robot travels
right and slips at the same time, it is a diagonal movement
that only falls if the target square is a cliff square. The goal
is to minimise the cost of travelling to the goal and reduce
the risk of falling off the edge of the cliff.
To simplify the discussion, the agent cannot leave the X
by Y grid; actions that would take the agent outside the
grid are inadmissable. The intelligent agent has five actions:
up, down, left, right and terminate. It has observations
which indicate whether the actions successfully occurred,
whether the robot slipped, whether it falls of a cliff (die) or
reaches a goal. (right & slip) is an observation that the robot
successfully moved right and slipped down one square. A
four by four Cliff World is illustrated in the Fig. 2 where S
is the starting square, G is the goal square, V are the squares
where the robot can slip down one square and C are cliff
squares.
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Figure 3: A Cliff World Policy that reaches goal safely
B. With highly probable slip and no risk model
We demonstrate behaviour of the algorithm without the
need for a risk model; the probability of slipping is high
(0.5) such that the MOMCTS sampling will be able to plan
for the contingency of slipping towards the goal. This was
run with the number of Monte-Carlo samples set to 105.
Here the algorithm makes a good decision. Fig. 3 (graph-
ical interpretation) and Fig. 4 (policy tree) show one of
the policies from the solution set which optimised both
objectives.
C. With low probability slip and no risk model
We now consider the problem where the risk of falling that
is acceptable is 10−8. The Cliff World structure remains the
same but the probability of slipping is changed to 10−6.
In this scenario, the MOMCTS-SC without a risk model
would produce an optimistic policy as it unlikely to en-
counter a simulation that shows the catastrophic falling off
a cliff. Since the number of samples set was to 105, the
probability of simulating a single catastrophic event is 0.1
in the best case if all simulations are (and can be) tracked, or,
5×10−6 in the worst case if the simulations were not tracked
at all. In either case, expecting an event to be simulated at
these low probabilities is not feasible.
The action sequence in the produced policy that reached
the goal was: up→ right→ right→ right→ down. This
ends up being the shortest path to the goal using squares on
the cliff’s edge – not very safe if the risk of falling with
10−6 is not acceptable.
D. With low probability slip and risk model
Now, we use a risk model Mx to constrain the search
algorithm to solve the problem in Section IV-C.
The risk model would need to behave such that it con-
strains the actions of the POMDP planner by calculating the
probability that an action enters a hazardous state. In this
example, it is easy to see that since the only approach into
the cliff are the squares above the cliff square, the probability
of slipping into the cliff will only exceed the acceptable
threshold if these squares above the cliff are entered.
To create a HMM-based model we define two approaches:
one with additional information-sharing through adding ob-
servations, and one without.
In the case without additional information, a HMM-
encoding of the risk model would match the process model
where the action and observation pairs of the process model
are combined to be observations in the risk model. This
follows from the representation defined in Section III-B.
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Figure 4: Policy generated by MOMCTS-SC with contingencies to avoid the cliff.
Input: policy set P = {p0, p1, . . . , pN}
Output: policy po
Sort P according to lowest risk first;
for i← 1toN do
riskdiff ← risk difference between pi−1 and pi;
rewarddiff ← reward diff. between pi−1 and pi;
if g(riskdiff , rewarddiff ) then
return pi−1
end
end
return pN
Algorithm 4: POLICY-PREFERENCE
In the case of adding additional observations to the
problem definition (i.e. add sensors, which may or may
not be physical), a much simpler risk model can be cre-
ated. For example, we let the risk model ‘see’ the cliff
edge by maintaining the value of the manhattan distance
to the cliff. This would allow the risk model to define
a state space based on the distance to the cliff edge:
Sx = {normal,nearcliffedge,cliffedge}. The transition func-
tions based on this additional observation would give the
risk model the equivalent power as our previous one.
The policy generated by the algorithm using either risk
model is up→ up→ right→ right→ right→ down→
down. Thus, the algorithm generates a plan that has a ‘safety
margin’ of one square from the edge of the cliff as dictated
by the risk model.
V. PREFERENCE SELECTION
Preference selection of objectives a priori, i.e. before
the planning process, typically involves some mathematical
combination of the components in the vector of objectives to
produce a scalar value, for example, a linear weighted sum
of objective values. A posteori preference selection involves
selecting the preferences after the planning process has taken
place and yielded a set of viable policies.
As our planning algorithm gives an output a set of safe
policies, it enables a posteori preference selection. For
safe decision-making, a preference selection mechanism is
required that selects the policies that do not seek reward
at the expense of excessive risk. Seeking reward with some
acceptable amount of risk is fine, as long as it is limited and
not minimised or maximised unnecessarily.
We give one possible two-objective preference selection
mechanism based on As Low As Reasonably Practicable
(ALARP) principle. This is shown in Algorithm 4. The
ALARP principle is often used to make safety-related deci-
sions in the UK and utilises the concept of grossly dispro-
portionate to refer to a factor (function g in Algorithm 4)
whereby the cost of risk reduction is far greater than the
benefit gained. Such a factor is normally expressed as a limit
of the cost per life saved; for example, it may be considered
disproportionate to spend more than £5M per life saved.
VI. FURTHER WORK
There are two main directions for further work.
Firstly, our algorithm is only part of a planner; other
concerns not addressed here include real-time concerns –
it is difficult for pure Monte-Carlo Tree Search algorithms
to guarantee when it has found a safe policy as this is
highly dependent on the search space. This may require
deterministic fallbacks and further work must consider how
this can be integrated with our solution.
Secondly, our work lays some foundations for separate
process and risk models. However, a method to construct
these risk models such that they are both valid for the domain
and sufficient to represent the risk for a particular decision-
making problem is still an open avenue for research.
VII. RELATED WORK
The planner we introduced in this paper operates using
a searching algorithm to generate the policy. It builds upon
seminal work in POMDP-solving by Kaelbling, Cassandra
and Littman [10], concepts of state factorisation [13], goal-
oriented (and state-based termination) POMDPs [14][4] and
modern Monte-Carlo Tree Search-based planners [7][8].
This latter choice in technology is important as it avoids the
explosion of computational complexity when using dynamic
programming [10] as opposed to MCTS-based planners and
is able to plan with respect to multiple objectives [8].
We are not alone in considering that single objective
utilities are not suitable for some applications [15]; a survey
by Roijers et.al. [1] provides a thorough treatment on clas-
sifying the underlying problems of these applications. The
majority of existing POMDP algorithms rely on dynamic
programming using the Bellman equation [10] which im-
plicitly assumes that the objectives are represented by scalar
values that can be combined linearly. Fortunately, Wang
and Sebag [2] have overcome this difficulty by utilising a
measure called the hypervolume indicator [16]: they devel-
oped a new multi-objective planning algorithm that uses the
Monte-Carlo Tree Search to optimise the sets of the best
policies. This provides the ability for a planner based on
this multi-objective search to select policies based on their
relative quality after the search has been performed. For our
work, this is crucial for an a posteori preference selection:
in an autonomous system context, this can be used to select
policies based on the ALARP principle (Section V), and, in a
decision-support context, the operator can make his decision
based on a number of different choices.
In systems safety literature, the direct implications of al-
gorithms on safety have been less explored. Work by Seward
et al. [17] uses a POMDP-based approach for autonomous
vehicle navigation: we take inspiration from their approach
in representing hazardous areas as states but they do not
give a firm theoretical basis for their reward value which
gives a high penalty for entering hazardous states to prevent
policies from making decisions that may lead to hazards. We
explicitly use multiple objectives including one of safety risk
instead. Later work by Kolobov [14] give a more theoretical
treatment of a similar concept called “dead end states”
that is analogous of states representing accidents in safety-
critical system processes. His work introduces a number
of different MDP formulations and solving algorithms that
help avoid “dead end states” through problem transformation
which effectively constrains the actions available to the
decision maker to reach “dead end states”. As his work was
based on problems defined with fully observable state spaces
[14], there is no easy adaptation of his work for partially
observable state spaces and assigning a range of severities
that interpolate between ‘no safety effect’ to ‘catastrophic’
accident. However, our work does take inspiration from
concepts of constraining actions, albeit during the planning
process rather than transforming the problem beforehand.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have captured the non-trivial nature
of ensuring that a planner is able to make safe decisions.
We have made the first steps to bridge the gap between an
autonomous planner that just simply optimises some criteria
to one that is able to make safe decisions using a complex
trade-off between multiple-objectives.
Specifically, we have promoted the concept of risk as a
first-class concept in our algorithm. It is treated ‘above’ other
objectives in the sense that it acts as both an optimisation
criteria as well as a hard constraint on what counts as an
“acceptably safe policy”. In doing so, we also recognise
that risk is not something that is to be forgotten at the
end of the planning stage. We provide an example ALARP-
inspired preference selection algorithm which chooses a
policy amongst the other acceptably safe policies that will
be the one that will be executed on the system.
Furthermore, we provide a method to define adequate
models for the purpose of our planning algorithm. These
models are structured to be both manageable from a safety
point of view, and, updated efficiently by the planning
algorithm without losing accuracy that may impact safety.
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